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The notion of the supernaturality of an event may be understood in vari-
ous ways. Most frequently ‘supernatural’ means ‘separated from nature’, 
i.e. different from nature. Thus, what is meant here is the difference in 
ontological character. The defi nitions of miracle, present in literature, 
emphasize the fact that we may talk about a miracle only when the phe-
nomenon takes place beyond the natural order or stands in opposition 
to it. The description of a miracle as a ‘supernatural event’ contains in 
itself the reference to that which is natural. The supernaturality of an 
event means that it surpasses (transcends) naturality. Additionally, this 
transcendence contains a kind of opposition to that which is natural. 
However, the miracle as a supernatural event takes place within the 
scope of that which is natural, although it takes place in a different way 
from natural events. It seems that this supernaturality may involve two 
things: (1) the course of the miraculous event; (2) the cause of the mi-
raculous event. We should consider each of them separately and specify 
what we understand by the supernatural course of the event and by the 
supernatural cause of the event. If we could prove that we can talk about 
supernatural events at least in one of the two signaled aspects of super-
naturality, then we would be able to defi ne the miraculous event as a 
supernatural one. The analyses proposed in the paper allow us to for-
mulate the following statement concerning the miraculous event, which 
is, to a great extent, a critical correction of the traditional way of under-
standing it: the miracle may be correctly understood as a supernatural 
event, only when this supernaturality concerns the personal cause of the 
event and not its course.
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1. Introduction
The notion of the supernaturality of an event may be understood in 
various ways (see Williams 1990 and Daston 1991). Most frequently 
‘the supernatural’ means ‘separated from the nature’, i.e. different 
from the nature. Thus, what is meant here is the difference in onto-
logical nature. Sometimes, the events understood as supernatural ones 
are those that belong to a certain part of nature inaccessible to human 
knowledge. In this case, the problem of supernaturality is reduced to 
the question of human cognitive limitations. Therefore, the supernatu-
ral thing is the one, which hasn’t been known yet or which will never 
be known as natural.1
The defi nitions of miracle, we can encounter, emphasize the fact 
that we may talk about the miracle only when the phenomenon takes 
place beyond the natural order or stands in opposition to it.2 As a result, 
the natural (scientifi c) explanation of the event is not possible and will 
never be so. It seems, therefore, that the attribute of supernaturality, 
which expresses the ontology of the miracle, is regarded as an irreduc-
ible base for asserting its absolute inexplicability in terms of nature.3 
Simultaneously, the miracle as a supernatural event is regarded as the 
act of exceeding the laws of natural sciences (scientifi c laws) as well as 
the laws of the nature itself.
The description of the miracle as a ‘supernatural event’ contains in 
itself the reference to that which is natural. The supernaturality of an 
event means that it surpasses (transcends) naturality. Additionally, 
this transcendence contains a kind of opposition to that which is natu-
ral. Although the supernaturality of the event is a kind of unnaturality, 
the natural element is not entirely annihilated by it. Rather, we should 
1 See Miller, Vandome and McBrewster (2009: 36–37). Such an approach to the 
supernaturality of the miracle is present e.g. in John Locke’s works. For Locke, 
the violation of the established course of nature by a miracle involves merely the 
violation of the laws, causes and effects we know. Thus, the miracle, understood as 
a violation of the laws of nature involves, in fact, the conformity with laws that are 
unknown to us. These laws, together with the ones we know, constitute the full set 
of the ‘laws of nature’ (see Mooney 2005: 150).
2 The notion of the miracle as an event that contradicts natural laws originates 
from the distinction between the natural and supernatural causes, introduced by 
Anselm of Canterbury. William of Auvergne, in turn, distinguished two elements 
within the notion of miracle: the Divine origin and the opposition to the forces of 
nature. The description of the miracle as a fact as opposed to nature, most probably, 
appeared for the fi rst time in the work of medieval scholar, Alexander of Hales’. Yet, 
he noted that specifying the miracle as a ‘contra naturam’ event is insuffi cient, as 
strange and mysterious things may also take place that are inconsistent with nature 
or even in opposition to it and they are not miracles, because they arise from natural 
causes (see Grant 1952).
3 Such an approach towards miraculous events is characteristic of apologetics 
(fundamental theology), and is manifested in numerous statements concerning 
miraculous events such as ‘violating the laws of nature’ (see Hesse 1965: 36; Walker 
1982: 103–108; Basinger 1984: 1–8).
 A. Świeżyński,  Philosophical Critique of the Concept of Miracle 59
say that what we have in the case of a miraculous event is the meta-
morphosis of the natural into the supernatural.4
Although the supernatural event is usually regarded as being 
brought about in an unnatural way, it is not a necessary condition of 
the supernaturality of the event. The supernatural event may have 
no cause, and despite this fact, it may be the event going ‘beyond’ the 
causal force of nature. For instance, a cosmologist with purely materi-
alistic views may say that the fi rst natural phenomenon in the history 
of the cosmos was a supernatural event, which was not engendered 
by any previous natural cause.5 Moreover, although it is necessary for 
the supernatural cause to be unnatural in character, the supernatural 
event may be both natural and unnatural in its course. The only re-
quirement is that the supernatural event cannot be brought about in a 
natural way, i.e. by a natural cause. It may be useful at this point, to 
introduce the distinction between the permanently (unconditionally) 
supernatural event and the conditionally supernatural one. The former 
is the event, which may never be caused by a natural cause. The latter, 
however, could be caused by a natural cause on certain conditions, but 
in this particular case, these conditions are not met.6
Hence, it is sometimes suggested that the miracle should be de-
scribed as the natural effect of the event which was brought about by 
an unnatural cause, and which couldn’t be brought about in a natural 
way (see P. Dietl 1968: 130–134; Young 1972: 123; Ward 2002: 741–
750). Such a defi nition doesn’t contain the direct statement concerning 
the character of the unnatural cause. Hence, scholars claim that the 
miracle is the event, which remains beyond the capabilities of nature 
and its activities. They talk about miraculous events as being exclu-
sively unnatural, and not as being merely supernatural.7
However, the question of the degree of transcendence, of that which 
is natural within supernatural events, is still a matter of debate among 
authors dealing with the problem of miracles.8 They commonly agree 
4 For example, biblical miracles are supernatural events taking place within the 
natural world (Ex 14,1–30; 2Chr 5:1–14; Jn 2:1–11 and many more)
5 Such a situation may take place in the case of cosmology of cyclic cosmos, in 
which we are unable to indicate the fi rst natural event. For example, see Steinhardt 
and Turok 2001: 1436–1439.
6 For instance, the virgin conception of a child is naturally possible with the use 
of so-called artifi cial insemination, yet, it wasn’t so in the case of Christ’s conception 
by the Holy Virgin, as the appropriate medical technique was unknown then. Yet, 
the very distinction between that which is ‘natural’ and that which is ‘artifi cial’ 
seems arguable in many cases (see Meller 2010: 191–199).
7 Not every unnatural cause need be regarded as a supernatural one, although 
each supernatural cause would, at the same time, be an unnatural one. Thus, we 
may still distinguish the category of ‘merely unnatural cause’ (see Clarke 2007). It 
doesn’t change the fundamental problem of the unambiguous determination of the 
different nature of these causes.
8 “The fundamental problem is not about miracle, but about transcendence” 
(Hesse 1965: 42).
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that the miracle is the effect of God’s action, but they argue with re-
gard to determining a suffi cient basis for asserting God’s intervention 
in nature. Some of them think that the miraculous phenomenon has 
to be one that has not been explained by science so far.9 Others tend 
to be stricter and claim that in order for a given event to be classifi ed 
as a miracle, it has to be proved that it is not only unexplained so far, 
but also can never be explained.10 Still others express the opinion that 
even the phenomenon, for which there exists a natural explanation, a 
miraculous event has only occurred, provided we know for certain that 
it was actually performed by God (see Clarke 1997).
Thus, the miracle treated as a supernatural event should be regard-
ed as transcending regularities that exist within nature and those at-
tributed to it by natural scientists. Yet, in the case of the transcending 
regularities that exist within nature and those attributed to it by natu-
ral scientists. Yet, in the case of the aforementioned transcendence, 
we have not only insuffi cient human knowledge about the world and 
its processes, but also the transcendence of a certain state of nature—
i.e. its internal regularities—independent of human knowledge. The 
supernatural event is, therefore, regarded as the event transcending 
the laws of nature, and constituting the ontological structure of mate-
rial reality. Because of this transcendence, the miraculous event is also 
treated as inexplicable within the methods and explanations provided 
by natural sciences.
The discrepancies just signaled, in which there also appears the 
problem of a natural inexplicability of the miracle, make us refl ect more 
deeply upon defi ning the miraculous event as a supernatural one. It 
seems that this supernaturality may involve two things: (1) the course 
of a miraculous event; (2) the cause of a miraculous event. We should 
consider each of them separately and specify what we understand by 
the supernatural course of event and by the supernatural cause of 
event. If we could prove that we can talk about supernatural events 
in at least one of the two signaled aspects of supernaturality, then we 
would be able to defi ne the miraculous event as a supernatural one.
2. A critique of the concept of miracle 
as an event with a supernatural course
‘Extraordinariness’ of the course of event can be understood as being in 
the epistemological or ontological category. Thus, there are situations 
(at least potentially), in which our being surprised and astonished can-
9 Yet, some scholars think that such an approach towards the miracle carries in 
itself the danger that a phenomenon in the current state of knowledge regarded as a 
miracle may turn out to be a natural one in the future.
10 “We can only speak of a miracle when an event occurs outside and against 
the known order of nature. This event must not be open to any natural explanation 
whatsoever, and it must also never be capable of explanation in any natural way 
whatsoever” (Loos 1965: 46).
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not be treated merely as the consequence of lack of knowledge of the 
nature of the world (a lack that may be overcome by gaining a more 
thorough knowledge of reality); it is rather, that our being surprised 
and astonished should be treated as something related to the irreduc-
ibility of the unpredictable character of natural processes, that follow 
from their  functioning in a way that is different from the normal (natu-
ral) one. However, the ontological extraordinariness doesn’t seem to be 
the necessary determinant of that which is miraculous. This is so, be-
cause the supernatural course of the event is the one that should differ 
signifi cantly from the natural course. The supernatural course should 
mean violation, suspension, or surpassing the regularities of nature. 
Each of the situations just mentioned, concerns, in turn, the change 
within the metaphysical structure of material beings or imposing on 
them (from outside) a new way of acting and interacting. Yet, it seems 
that, in both cases, the way the world functions remain natural but dif-
ferent with respect to the phenomenal sphere.
So far, understanding miraculous events as the ones violating, sus-
pending or surpassing the laws of nature in force is, to a great extent, 
the consequence of the picture of the world, which was provided by 
the emergence and development of the natural sciences. The period 
of looking at nature in a mechanistic and strictly deterministic way, 
especially in the 18th, and partly, in the 19th centuries, strengthened 
the conviction that events and processes inconsistent with the estab-
lished regularities of nature violate its laws. Yet, further development 
of natural sciences questioned such an approach towards phenomena, 
which couldn’t be explained by adopted scientifi c theories. The remark-
able example of this change is the emergence of quantum mechanics 
in 20th century. The rules of quantum mechanics are not deterministic 
but statistical. The fact that contemporary natural sciences rejected 
the strictly deterministic picture of reality changed the status of these 
sciences as the one that determines accurately what is or is not possible 
within nature. Existing scientifi c theories turned out, and still turn 
out, to be susceptible either to partial modifi cations or to being totally 
questioned.11 Yet, the switch from Newtonian to quantum physics, as 
well as the emergence of deterministic chaos theory and of other theo-
ries didn’t signifi cantly infl uence the way miraculous events are un-
derstood. They still are the events, which by their nature, fall beyond 
the regularities of the natural world. Because of the lack of any clearly 
formulated idea, the question of supernaturality of miraculous events 
still remains a matter of debate.
In considerations concerning the miracle being understood as the 
violation or suspension of regularities of nature, we may encounter 
the opinion that the very concept of suspension or violation of some 
11 The example of such changes in cosmology may be the theory of the Stationary 
State, which was refuted because of new empirical results concerning universe 
expansion (see Singh 2005).
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regularity is internally contradictory. If the true event Z occurs incon-
sistently with the nomological principle N concerning the course of 
phenomena, it means that the principle N doesn’t determine properly 
‘that which cannot happen’, and for that reason, this principle can no 
longer be treated as nomological. Yet, if the principle N is really a no-
mological one, the event Z cannot be regarded as its actual violation. 
So, the event Z cannot be understood as being an ‘actual’ violation of 
any regularity. The nomological principle is regarded as the universal 
and necessary law (see McKinnon 1967: 309–312; Flew 1976: 28–30).
Other authors, who think that the fundamental problem connected 
with the concept of miracle as the event that breaks the regularities 
of nature involves the fact that this conception is used to defend the 
supranaturalistic approach within theistic apologetics, argue with the 
above opinion (see Corner 2007: 2; Byrne 1978: 166–169; Kellenberger 
1979: 152–153). They claim that in the case of the natural functioning 
of nature, the laws of nature indicate that we have a situation, in which 
there is no intervention by God. But these laws do not inform us about 
the way the world functions in the case of divine intervention. When 
this intervention takes place, the laws of nature are violated and a mi-
raculous event emerges (see Otte 1996: 155).
The treatment of miraculous events, which in their course, surpass 
the laws of nature, requires a more detailed description of the ontologi-
cal structure of a supernatural event, and then, considering the valid-
ity of describing the miracle as a supernatural event. The miraculous 
event surpassing the laws of nature may be treated as the exception 
from these laws. We should then wonder whether such an event is su-
pernatural or natural in character. The answer will depend on the ad-
opted type of the cause of a given event. Let us suppose that the event X 
is inconsistent with the law of nature P, confi rmed many times. There 
are three possible explanations of the occurrence of the event X: (1) 
some unknown (and perhaps inscrutable) natural cause brought about 
this event; (2) the event X was brought about by the action of the super-
natural cause; (3) the event X doesn’t have a natural or supernatural 
cause; it can be regarded as a single, unique anomaly.
In the case of fi rst option, there is no reason for understanding the 
event as surpassing the law of nature and for treating it as a super-
natural event. In the second case, however, the event is treated as sur-
passing the law of nature and hence it is a supernatural event. Yet, if 
the laws of nature determine what happens (or doesn’t happen) in spe-
cifi c natural circumstances, they cannot be used to explain the event, 
which happens when the supernatural cause acts. Therefore, even if 
the event that took place is inconsistent with the law of nature and 
was brought about by a supernatural cause, we wouldn’t be able to 
say that it surpasses the laws of nature and hence it is a supernatu-
ral event. The third option, in turn, assumes that the law of nature 
is adequately and empirically confi rmed and the event, which takes 
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place, does so only once. Thus, we can say that the principle and ex-
ception from it are present simultaneously, namely, that the type X 
events both occur and do not occur in the same natural circumstances. 
Such a situation would mean that we wouldn’t have to make a choice 
between the rejection of event X and the modifi cation or rejection of the 
law P. Some authors express the opinion that only such events may be 
regarded as surpassing the laws of nature (see Basinger and Basinger 
1986: 13–14). Thus, it would be a supernatural event, not because of 
its supernatural cause, but because it surpasses the laws of nature, 
i.e. its supernatural course. Nevertheless, such an event couldn’t be 
described as a miracle, as it excludes the action of any cause, includ-
ing God. Therefore, in the light of the options just considered, we have 
the alternatives: the event is supernatural either because of its course 
(it can be described as violating, suspending or surpassing the laws 
of nature), or because of the action by the supernatural cause, which 
brought it about. The third option, in which an event is supernatural, 
due to both its supernatural course and cause, turns out to be unneces-
sary, because the action of the supernatural cause doesn’t necessarily 
have to generate the supernatural course of the event. In the case of the 
second element of the above alternative, the event is not supernatural 
in its course (it is not questioning the laws of nature), but is supernatu-
ral because of its supernatural cause.12 Thus, the second element of the 
above alternative, i.e. the action of the supernatural cause, is suffi cient 
to classify the event as the supernatural one, without deciding whether 
its course is, or is not, supernatural.
It is reasonable to present fundamental diffi culties, which emerge 
when a supranaturalistic conception of the miracle is adopted, with 
regard to its supernatural course. The element, appearing within the 
conception just mentioned, is the attempt to defi ne the miracle as the 
event that directly violates the laws of nature, or at least, the one that 
surpasses these laws or brings about any other form of intervention 
into the natural function of the world. Yet, there is no clear reason 
for accepting the view that the event, which cannot be subject to any 
natural regularity, has to be treated as the violation of this regularity. 
While analyzing the conception of miracle as the event violating the 
laws of nature, we have to note that within this framework, the miracle 
is treated as something, which ‘tears apart’ the structure of nature, 
and hence the miracle is possible only if we assume the existence of an 
effi cient cause external to nature. Yet, the internal contradiction is not 
obvious within the very conception of violating the laws of nature, as 
contemporary writers want it. There is no inconsistency in the state-
12 According to Mumford, the best way of understanding the miracle is to treat it 
as the event, which is natural with regard to its course, but having its supernatural 
cause. In Mumford’s opinion, such conception of the miracle may (but doesn’t have 
to) lead to the claim that its emergence is necessarily connected with breaking the 
laws of nature (see Mumford 2001: 191–202; cf. Clarke 2003: 459–463; Luck 2003: 
465–469; Clarke 2003: 471–474).
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ment that an event happened, which we cannot subordinate to the laws 
of nature, and that the laws of nature are understood as fully deter-
mined regularities.13 But there is no reason to treat such an event as 
a violation, i.e. as something, which in some way, is inconsistent with 
the real structure of the natural world or as something that forces us 
to accept the existence of anything surpassing nature.14 It is impossible 
to point to any empirical criteria when distinguishing the anomalies 
caused by supernatural intervention into nature from ‘ordinary anom-
alies’ or from spontaneous breakdowns of natural order. This is why su-
pranaturalists have no reasons for claiming that a specifi c anomaly is 
the result of supernatural intervention into the natural order of things 
and that the emergence of this anomaly means the supernatural course 
of events. Let us emphasize here that there exists the possibility of 
proving the distinction just mentioned, in the case of capturing super-
natural intervention in teleological terms.
It is worth noting once again, that the main problem connected with 
the conception of the miracle as the event that breaks the laws of na-
ture involves the fact that this conception is used to defend the supra-
naturalistic approach. But the category of the supernatural course of a 
miraculous event turns out to be useless for an apologist, who seeks to 
persuade us that nature is not all that exists.15 This is so because it is 
impossible to provide a way of distinguishing the event proceeding in 
the supernatural way, from the one being an ordinary natural anomaly. 
It seems, therefore, that we should search for other objective criteria in 
13 The law of nature is only conditionally (physically) necessary; it is not absolutely 
(metaphysically) necessary, as its negation leads to falseness and not to absurdity. 
If the laws of nature are not absolutely, but relatively necessary, miraculous events 
are not contradictions in themselves.
14 We can also imagine the situation, in which the miracle means a natural effect 
caused by the supernatural cause, and this natural effect could also potentially be 
brought about in a natural way, by a natural cause. Miraculous events understood 
in this way can be divided into two categories: (1) ‘replacement’ miracles—when 
the natural cause, which could appear in a natural way, is actually brought about 
by a supernatural cause; (2) miracles ‘through the natural non-determination of 
phenomena’—when the natural effect, which can appear in a natural way, is not 
caused by a natural cause, but, at the same time, this natural effect is different from 
the one, which would appear, if it was not caused by a supernatural cause. Scholars 
started talking about miracles of the second kind together with the emergence of 
quantum mechanics. These miracles became popular, because in their supporters’ 
opinion, if at the atomic level nature is not determined, then God could intervene at 
this level, without causing the supernatural course of the event, and merely ‘choosing’ 
a specifi c quantum state of a physical system. Manipulating the initial conditions at 
the quantum level, God may bring about unusual events that are inconsistent with 
the regularities observed at present (see Murphy 1995: 112).
15 “The fact that our senses and measuring apparatus are able to capture some 
of these things, while some others are not, is the epistemological not ontological 
problem. So if we want to adopt the ontological criterion, in spite of all, then, if we 
are unable to distinguish between the nature and non-nature, we have to assert that 
the nature includes all the things, including angels and miracles, if we believe in 
them” (Tałasiewicz 2007: 408).
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determining that which is extraordinary-supernatural and that the ex-
traordinariness of the event, understood in an ontological way, doesn’t 
have to be identifi ed with violating, suspending or surpassing the regu-
larities of nature (see Adams 1992; Hanfi eld 2001; Larmer 2011).
3. The critique of the concept of miracle 
as an event with a supernatural cause
The conclusion to the previously made detailed considerations of the 
supernatural cause of an event is the rejection of these conceptions 
of miracle, which assume that a possible miraculous event can only 
be explained by pointing to the supernatural cause, as being the one 
that is responsible for its occurrence.16 The supranaturalistic approach, 
which I’m criticizing, treats the supernatural cause as the hypothesis 
explaining the event, concurrent with the naturalistic attempts of ex-
plaining the event. Hence, if it is possible to point to natural causes 
being responsible for the event, referring to the supernatural cause no 
longer makes sense.
The fundamental problem connected with the notion of a supernatu-
ral cause is that supranaturalists treat the supernatural cause analogi-
cally to the natural one. Yet, such an analogy should be regarded as the 
empty one, because treating the supernatural cause similarly to the 
natural one changes, each time, our notion of the supernatural cause to 
that of a natural cause. Additionally, there exists no way of character-
izing the supernatural cause without making an analogy with the natu-
ral one. But if we seek to preserve the fundamental distinctness of the 
character of supernatural and natural cause, then there would be the 
problem of determining the way the supernatural cause infl uences the 
natural elements of the world (see Miles 1966; Pratt 1968; Saler 1977).
Thus, those who defend the claim concerning the supernatural 
cause of some event, encounter a dilemma—two possible solutions both 
of which turn out to be unsatisfactory. A supranaturalist, willing to 
explain the conception of supernatural cause, characterizes it in a way 
similar to the natural one. In consequence, the difference between the 
two causes is obliterated, and the supernatural causality is reduced 
to the natural one. If the supporter of the existence of a supernatural 
cause wants to justify its distinct character, he may encounter another 
problem. When he accepts its distinctness from a natural cause and 
treats it as an unnatural cause, a doubt arises concerning the possibil-
ity of defi ning it as a cause as such, since the common basis for compar-
ing both causes is removed. Moreover, the radical distinction between 
the natural and supernatural raise questions on the abilities of causal 
impact of that which is supernatural, on that which is natural.
16 There is also the possibility of understanding the supernatural cause as the 
one cooperating with the natural ones. In this case, the supernatural cause doesn’t 
exclude the operation of natural causes.
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The analogy between the natural and supernatural cause turns out 
to be inadequate in the sense that the supernatural cause doesn’t have 
in it a certain crucial feature, which the natural cause possesses, name-
ly, the property of physical impact. Thus, it is unknown how the super-
natural cause infl uences the natural world, and if it is impossible to 
explain, in what sense can we talk about the supernatural cause as the 
one analogous to the natural cause? Moreover, in order to use the anal-
ogy in question, we should assume that the action of the supernatural 
cause is subject to specifi c laws, as it is in the case of the natural causes 
operating inside the world. These laws should be distinguishable from 
the laws concerning the functioning of nature. Yet, we do not know 
the laws other than those functioning inside the universe. Thus, what 
we should do is either to assume that the interactions between nature 
and the supernatural are subject to the laws of the nature we know, or 
to speculate on the existence of some unknown laws governing these 
interactions. In the fi rst case, that which we describe as the super-
natural turns out only to be the continuation of that which is natural 
and the expansion of the applicability of natural laws. In the second 
case, however, we should assert that we can say nothing about these 
unknown laws. We may observe the cooperation of  nature and the su-
pernatural just from the viewpoint of the observer situated inside the 
natural universe and using its laws; and this doesn’t give us the chance 
to reasonably use the analogy between the natural and supernatural 
laws, or even to say something positive about the existence of the lat-
ter. The laws concerning nature always operate together with the phys-
ical properties of bodies, e.g. their mass, momentum, electric charge, 
etc. Then what would the statement mean that the laws governing the 
interaction between the natural and supernatural being ‘is similar’ to 
the laws governing the interaction of material bodies, with the objec-
tion that, because one element of the interaction is supernatural, i.e. 
nonphysical, it is not the interaction between material bodies? Once 
again, we see that the analogy is inadequate (Corner 2015: 48–49).
Thus, the supernatural cause cannot possess any physical proper-
ties, and if such properties are attributed to it, it becomes the natural 
cause. If we treat both kinds of causes as totally distinct from each 
other, then, because we know only the natural causes, we may wonder 
if the supernatural action may still be treated as the cause.
A similar diffi culty may be observed within the conception of a su-
pernatural explanation, which is a further element of the supranatu-
ralistic conception of the miracle. This explanation is reduced to ap-
proving the action of the supernatural cause. If it is applied in terms of 
being an analogy of scientifi c (natural) explanation, it should have the 
property of empirical verifi ability, which obviously seems impossible, 
because of the total distinctness between the supernatural cause and 
the natural causes. If, in turn, empirical verifi cation of the action of 
the cause, which remains beyond the set of causes known so far, the 
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conception of supernatural explanation would turn out to be unneces-
sary, because each explanation, which can be verifi ed in an empirical 
way, loses the property of the supernatural explanation. So, we can 
assume that a given event is the miracle manifesting divine action, but 
we shouldn’t explain this event by looking for a supernatural cause. If 
we search for the explanation of a miraculous event, this explanation 
is completely different in character from the one used within natural 
sciences. Such an explanation should not refer to pointing to the cause, 
but should be teleological in character. Particularly, if we agree that 
explaining the event is realized not only by referring to the laws of na-
ture, but also by providing the meaning of a given fact.
There is still one more problem to be discussed here. It appears that 
when describing a natural anomaly such as the event with the super-
natural cause, we gain nothing. Why would the reference to the super-
natural cause be better than approving the action of some unknown 
natural cause or lack of any cause at all? The exception here is the situ-
ation in which we understand the supernatural cause as the personal 
one, which is identifi ed with God’s action. Yet, those two terms are 
not synonymous (although they are often used interchangeably). Thus, 
only if we treat the anomaly as a manifestation of personal divine ac-
tion (analogical to human action), are we able to prove the signifi cant 
contrast between an event of this sort and an ‘ordinary’ anomaly, i.e. a 
spontaneous break in natural order. The very assertion concerning the 
action of the supernatural cause changes nothing, because such cause, 
by its nature, cannot be connected with the space and time of our world. 
Its action cannot be transmitted by any physical interaction.
Let us apply here the comparison to hypothetical material objects 
with features that are impossible to recognize empirically. Even if a 
given object had an unrecognizable feature, it would contribute noth-
ing to our knowledge of it in relation to our knowledge of the objects 
without this feature. By introducing the supernatural cause, and treat-
ing it, at the same time, as a special kind of natural one, we gain noth-
ing. Because we cannot imagine the supernatural cause in any way 
other than as an analogy of the natural cause, we should propose, as 
a replacement, the conception of the supernatural-personal cause and, 
in consequence, the teleological approach towards the miracle as the 
manifestation of God’s will and action, together with the context it is 
manifested in. Simultaneously, we should move away from capturing 
God’s action in purely causal terms, particularly, when understood as 
having an outside (interventionist) impact on the world.
Thus, the basic mistake concerning the conception of a miraculous 
event is the application of an interventionist conception of God’s action 
(breaking the laws of nature), as well as combining it with the notion 
of a supernatural cause and supernatural course of the event. It leads 
to the emergence of the opposition between God and nature, which is 
absolute, and impossible to overcome notionally; it also leads to a one-
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sided way of looking at  miraculous events as the effects of divine action 
understood in terms of the way an effi cient cause operates.
4. Conclusion
David Hume, one of the most famous critics of the possibility of miracu-
lous events, expressed the conviction that the accounts of miracles and 
prodigies will be found in all history, sacred and profane (D. Hume, 
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section X: Of Mira-
cles). The accuracy of the prediction made by the Scottish rationalist 
has been confi rmed in the subsequent centuries (including the present 
one). This confi rmation was made through the constant appearance of 
such accounts, and discussions, which concerned, and still concern, the 
possibility of the occurrence of events described as miraculous, and the 
nature of these events. Moreover, Hume’s statement seems to reveal 
the element of human nature, which generates the human need of ac-
cepting new intellectual challenges in the face of such events, or at 
least, the theoretical possibility of their occurrence. Without judging 
at this point, how to classify the events described as miraculous, we 
should say that the miracle is a particularly interesting object of inter-
est for the human mind. This is because of the mystery accompanying 
the miracle; because of the complexity of the problems considered with 
respect to the miracle; and because of the views revealed when discuss-
ing the miracle.
Yet, is the problem of the miracle important and interesting from 
a philosophical point of view? The views in this respect vary consider-
ably, yet it seems that the notion of a miracle and its content should 
be interesting for those who attempt to know the nature of the reality 
around them, and the reality that they are an element of; and also 
for those who endeavor to understand the process of discovering the 
world and the existential experience of a human being. It appears that 
a miracle, and the considerations of it, exemplifi es the content of these 
very fundamental questions stimulating everyone who tries to gain at 
least a slightly better understanding and at least a bit more wisdom. 
If a miracle itself is the peripheral problem for philosophy in its tra-
ditional sense, the problems it poses are certainly, very important for 
philosophers as the basis for genuine philosophical quests.
What we can also observe in contemporary philosophy of the mira-
cle is the characteristic trend towards ‘naturalizing’ miraculous events. 
This tendency in philosophical quests takes two basic forms: (1) the 
tendency to explain miraculous events by suggesting the manner in 
which God would act within nature (i.e. explaining the ‘mechanism’ 
of God’s action within nature); and (2) the tendency to reduce miracu-
lous events to purely natural ones, the explanation of which should be 
sought within constantly developing natural sciences. Both the afore-
mentioned ways of ‘naturalizing’ the miracle pose certain diffi culties. 
The fi rst could be described as a ‘moderate naturalization’. Although 
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it preserves the notion of miracle, there are some objections against it, 
namely because, it imposes a certain vision of God’s action within na-
ture, while trying to negotiate this vision with the present state of nat-
ural knowledge about the world. The second, however, goes even fur-
ther; it can be described as a ‘radical naturalization’, because it seems 
to lead straight towards questioning the traditional sense of miracle 
the possibility of its occurrence, and as a result, to classifying it as an 
ordinary natural phenomenon. Both forms of naturalizing miraculous 
events, present in literature, seem to be dead ends as far as their re-
sults are concerned. They lead either to endless speculations on God’s 
interactions with nature, or to eliminating the miracle as such. If we 
want to avoid both dangerous situations and their results, we should 
take a fresh look at the problem of the miracle and we should fi nd a 
new way of understanding it.
Understanding the miracle is closely connected with understanding 
it as an event caused by God.17 It is usually assumed that if a miracu-
lous event is the effect of God’s intervention in the material world, it 
must be regarded as different from the ordinary (natural) phenomena 
of nature. In this case, the postulate of regarding the miracle as a su-
pernatural event is the consequence of understanding the miraculous 
event, as the one, the effi cient cause of which is God. Yet, we can adopt 
the reverse way of argumentation, namely, starting from the ontologi-
cal extraordinariness of the event, understood as its supernaturality, 
we can search for an adequate cause for events of this type. This way of 
analyzing the notion of miraculous event has the philosophical advan-
tage of not assuming a priori that this event was brought about by the 
actions of a transcendental being on nature.
If we accept the possibility of the existence of extraordinary-su-
pernatural events we may (and even should) think of their cause. The 
potential occurrence of supernatural events, because of their being 
ontologically diverse from the natural ones, requires the appropriate 
justifi cation. It means the necessity to point to the cause, which would 
be capable of bringing about a supernatural event. Because natural 
causes are capable of bringing about only natural effects, the cause, 
which would be responsible for the occurrence of a supernatural event, 
should also be supernatural in character. The supernatural character 
of the cause bringing about a supernatural event means that it can-
not be any cause coming from the fi eld of nature. It is the case with 
both the part of nature, which is already known to us, and the natural 
processes and phenomena, which are still cognitively inaccessible. We 
assume that both the fi eld of known natural phenomena and the un-
known ones, and probably, the inscrutable ones too, is governed by the 
internal principles characteristic of this fi eld, and hence, on its own, it 
17 The authors dealing with the problem of miraculous events share the conviction 
that if there is no reason to regard a given event as caused by God, there is no reason 
either, to regard it as a miracle (see Corner 2015).
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doesn’t generate the events that can be regarded as supernatural ones. 
Thus, we should take into account that, the principle being the funda-
ment of causality, the effects are of the same nature as their causes, i.e. 
the effects are proportional to their causes.
Thus, while searching for an adequate cause of supernatural events, 
we may determine it as the external cause, transcendental in relation 
to the material world. Within a strictly philosophical perspective, the 
absolute being is usually regarded as such a transcendental factor. 
Within a philosophical and religious perspective (e.g. Christianity, Ju-
daism, Islam), however, the factor in question is called God and treated 
as the unique personal being. God, as a being, not belonging to nature, 
and His existence that is signifi cantly different in character from the 
material beings, seems to be regarded as the main candidate for caus-
ing a supernatural event; this is because of the characteristics, which 
are attributed to Him.18 Thus, the miracle, understood as a supernatu-
ral event, may be justifi ed by the action of supernatural cause, which 
is seen to be God.
Some authors claim that all the adequate and complete explana-
tions causal in character should be the scientifi c explanations, namely, 
they should determine empirically all the conditions, both necessary 
and suffi cient, for the occurrence of a given phenomenon. Therefore, if 
God’s action is, by its nature, non-empirical, any event caused directly 
by God contains in itself the effi cient cause, empirically unverifi able. 
Thus, such an event is supernatural and it cannot be adequately ex-
plained within natural sciences. This is why such an explanation can-
not be regarded as the one, which is causal in character (Nowell-Smith 
1950). For instance, the prayer that precedes the sudden healing of an 
ill person may be regarded as the circumstance preceding the healing 
and directly connected with God’s action, the result of which is the re-
covery. Yet, God and His actions are, by their nature, imperceptible to 
the human senses.
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